Laboratory experiments on the provision of public goods follow each subject over time as he interacts with a small group of others, deciding in each period how much of an initial allocation to contribute to a group good that yields a return to all group members. These experiments produce data sets that are rich in dynamics, as subjects respond not only to the parameters of the experiment, but also to previous allocation decisions made by themselves and the other individuals in their group. In most early studies, the data analysis consisted of an informal inspection of the time plots of data for each treatment, averaged over all participants. Subsequent studies conducted simple statistical tests of average behavior. There has been very little analysis of the individual data. Data sets from these experiments thus provide an unexploited opportunity to understand how an individual's behavior evolves over time in response to feedback about the behavior of others. A better understanding of the dynamics of behavior in these games has the potential to lead to the design of institutions that improve the efficiency of the private provision of public goods.
Introduction
One of the primary social problems studied by economists is the issue of how to fund the provision of public goods. What makes the public goods problem so interesting to the "dismal science" is the especially dismal theoretical prediction that the level of voluntary contributions should be zero, resulting in the public good never being produced. The theorist's approach to solving this problem has been to design a mechanism that gives agents the incentive to contribute enough to produce the socially optimal level of the public good (e.g., Laffont, 2000; Chander, 1993; Hurwicz and Walker, 1990; Groves and Ledyard, 1980) .
Experimental economists have instead focused on the Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism (VCM), an institution that mimics the incentive structure of a public goods problem (see Ledyard, 1995 for a survey). Experimental results typically show that contributions within the VCM framework are not as low as theorists expect, but nevertheless fall much below socially optimal levels. While a great deal has been discovered about average behavior in this simple game across a broad range of variations, there is still much to be understood. For example, overall contributions nearly always deteriorate over time, but as researchers we do not know why or by what mechanism this occurs. Behavior is highly heterogeneous across subjects, but we have been largely unable to explain the nature and sources of the heterogeneity. It is clear that subjects respond to each other's actions, but details of the interactions are not well understood.
In this paper we conduct a more in-depth analysis of VCM data from two classic studies in an attempt to better understand the underlying behavior.
An understanding of what information agents take into account and how they respond to information can help economists to design mechanisms that encourage the provision of public goods. Public goods experiments have already shown the critical importance of structural factors such as provision points (Marks and Croson, 1999; Rondeau, Schultze and Poe, 1999) , and social factors such as communication (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, et al, 1994; Wilson and Sell, 1997) and knowledge of the identity of one's group members (Andreoni and Petri, 2003) . Our work highlights the importance of information about the behavior of other group members, and the heterogeneity among agents in their initial contributions, as well as responses to changes in the environment. Fundraisers seem to be well aware of the importance of information about others' contributions, and actively manipulate information in their fundraising activities.
Manipulating information can significantly affect the level of contributions through the selective announcement of others' contributions (Harbaugh, 1998) or the announcement of an initial large contribution (Vesterlund, 2003; Andreoni, 2002) .
In this paper we suggest that data sets from VCM experiments can best be understood by approaching them explicitly as doubly-censored panels, in which both lagged dependent variables and lagged allocations from the subject's group play important roles as explanatory variables. We estimate these models using data from two classic VCM experiments conducted by Isaac and Walker (1988) and Andreoni (1995) . Our models allow us to make a rich set of inferences about the intensity and asymmetry of individual responses to the recent behavior of the remainder of the individual's group. Subjects respond much more dramatically when their contributions are above average than when they are below average. Thus heterogeneity in initial contribution levels inherently leads to the deterioration of average contributions over time.
In addition, our models reproduce the qualitative results of both studies as to the impacts of the experimental treatments they considered, but in a more powerful and more statistically credible framework. Finally, we show that failure to take into account the substantial censoring of the data may lead to underestimates of the magnitude of treatment effects.
VCM Games and Data Analysis
Each subject in a VCM experiment is followed over time as he interacts with a small group of other subjects, deciding on how much of an initial allocation to contribute each period to a group good that yields a return to all members of the group. The individual allocation decisions in such settings typically exhibit very strong serial correlation. In addition -because subjects respond to the behavior of the rest of the group -individual allocations are significantly related to previous allocation decisions made by others. Moreover, data collected in these settings are almost always substantially censored: from below by the fact that an individual's allocation to the group good is constrained to be non-negative, and from above by the fact that an individual's allocation to the group good cannot exceed his endowment for that period.
The analysis of these VCM data often consists of little more than an informal inspection of a few time plots or testing whether the mean or median time-averaged allocations of individuals differ by experimental treatment. The former approach is simple, but forgoes statistical analysis altogether, thereby disregarding much of the information in the sample data.
The latter approach discards all of the dynamic information in the sample data and also violates the assumptions underlying the means/medians tests by ignoring the across-individual correlations in the data induced by their within-group interactions. Both of the studies whose data we reanalyze present only limited analysis of their data, using techniques such as these. (Andreoni, 1995; Issac and Walker, 1988) .
Several recent papers take a more sophisticated approach.
1 Clark (2002) uses OLS regression to compare contribution rates in a VCM experiment when each group's highest contributor in a given period is announced and when subjects can reward the highest contributor 1 Anderson, et al, (1998) present an alternative approach to the analysis of VCM contributions that focuses on decision errors.
in their group. He fails to account for dynamics or for the apparent censoring in the data, however. Solow and Kirkwood (2002) look for relationships between gender, group identity, and economic behavior in VCM experiments. They account for the fact that their sample data is censored but, like Clark (2002) , do not consider the dynamics. Neither paper accounts for the possible importance of individual effects due to the panel structure of the data. Gunnthorsdottir, Houser, McCabe and Ameden (2001) estimate dynamic decision-rule regressions using VCM data. In a fashion that they note is somewhat arbitrary, they first bisect their sample into "cooperator" subjects (who contribute more than 30% of their initial allocation in period one) and "free rider" subjects (who contribute less than this in the first period). They then estimate two separate dynamic regression models to explain the sample variation in the individual contributions in each period -one regression for the cooperator data and one for the free rider data. They use Tobit regression to account for the substantial double censoring in their data and attempt to model both the serial and across-subject dynamics in the data using functions of lagged dependent variables. They then informally compare the sizes and t-ratios of the estimated coefficients in the two regressions. Gunnthorsdottir, et al, (2001) do not, however, effectively consider the panel nature of their data in that they ignore the fact that -regardless of whether the ith subject is a cooperator or a free rider -this subject's group-good allocation in period t is substantially determined by a time-invariant person-specific (fixed) effect.
Consequently, the error term in their regression equations is correlated across time for each person, which violates the assumptions of the Tobit regression framework. Our approach substantially alleviates this problem.
We chose data sets from two well-known studies for our analysis (Isaac and Walker, 1988; and Andreoni, 1995) because of their importance in the area of VCM studies, and because the data sets are readily available. Both experiments were computerized. Subjects were given an endowment (E) each period, which could be allocated between a private account and a group account. Contributions to the group account paid to each member of the group the marginal per capita return (MPCR) times the total of the group's contributions.
Isaac and Walker (IW) test the effect on contributions of changing group size from 4 to 10, and of changing the MPCR from .3 to .75, using a 2x2 experimental design. Within a session, stable groups of a given size experience ten periods of one value for MPCR, followed by ten periods of the other value; the order of the MPCR values is blocked. Thus their data consist of 20 decision periods for each of 84 subjects. Andreoni (1995) tests the effect of positive and negative framing on contributions, holding group size and MPCR constant. In the positive frame, the level of the public good is determined by total contributions to the group account. In the negative frame, subjects withdraw amounts from the group account and transfer it to their private account. The amount remaining after withdrawals determines the level of the public good. In Andreoni's experiment, subjects are rematched each period into new groups. 2 His is a between-subjects design, so his data consist of ten periods for 80 subjects, 40 in each treatment.
A Panel Regression Model for VCM Contributions
We model t i C , , subject i's contribution to the group good in period t, expressed as a fraction of the subject's total period t endowment. The observed contribution is equal to C i,t * , a latent variable that could be characterized as "desired contribution," if and only if 1 0
Thus,
and C i,t * is determined by:
where the X t1 , X t2 ,…X tn include both time invariant variables such as treatment effects, and dynamic variables such as the deviation of subject i's contribution from that of the remainder of the group in round t-1.
i t D is a dummy variable specific to subject i, and subsumes all timeinvariant characteristics of the subject. This model allows for both the individual-specific fixed effects (γ 1 , γ 2 ,...γ m ) and the strong serial correlation that we expect (and find) in the IW and Andreoni C i,t data. This is a standard fixed-effects dynamic panel data regression model, but (so far as we know) such models have never been considered before with double censoring. Still, in principle, this model is estimable using the usual maximum likelihood methods for Tobit Type I models.
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Because of the censoring, some care must be taking in interpreting the estimated coefficients in this model. To see this consider a simpler model which retains the double censoring but suppresses all but one explanatory variable.
3 See Maddala (1983, pp. 160-1 and 186) for the likelihood function, and Amemiya (1973) only when c i * is in the interval (0,E). Outside of this interval the observed contribution is a constant -either 0 or E, depending on whether c i * is less than zero or greater than E.
Consequently, the magnitude of the apparent dependence of subject i's contribution on the explanatory variable is (on average) diminished whenever α + βx i either falls close to (or lies below) zero or approaches (or exceeds) E. In particular, since (c i
where f(z) is the unit normal density function. This probability peaks for x i such that sided censoring and including only a single lag in the dependent variable; Honore (1993) considers a non-parametric approach to this special case. α + βx i = E / 2 and diminishes to zero as |α + βx i − E / 2| increases. Intuitively, subject i's observed contribution becomes increasingly insensitive to x i as x i becomes sufficiently extreme that subject i is likely to be either not contributing at all or contributing his entire endowment. This apparent sensitivity is precisely what is needed so as to analyze the sensitivity of actual average contributions to changes in explanatory variables -e.g. this sensitivity might be relevant in predicting the cost of running a particular experiment -but it is β itself which quantifies how the subject's desired behavior depends on x.
Note also that using OLS to estimate the parameters α and β in the model (2); this is the comparison we make in our analysis below.
Descriptions of the data sets and variables:
The two data sets we examine are from experiments that were conducted to test different hypotheses. IW examines the effect of group size (4 or 10) and MPCR (.3 and .75) on an individual's contributions to the public good. As explained above, each session includes ten periods with one value of MPCR followed by ten periods using the other value of MPCR. Group size is varied across sessions. Explanatory variables for this data set include contributions, the treatment variables, and measures of how a subject's contribution in the previous round differed from the average contributions for their group. MPCRhi is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the high-mpcr sessions. Group size takes on the values 4 or 10 corresponding to the two group sizes.
The dummy variable First 10 periods was set to one in the first set of 10 periods and to zero in the second set. For subject i, the lagged value of the deviation of his own contribution (
from the value of the average contribution of all other members of the group in that round is denoted Deviation from Group(+) when this value is positive and is otherwise zero. Deviation from Group(-) is similarly defined for the observations for which this value is negative and is otherwise zero. These variables thus allow for a possible asymmetry in the responses. The variable C i,1 is the subject's initial contribution; this variable is used in Section 7.
Recall that the purpose of the Andreoni study is to test for the effect of positive or negative framing on contributions to a pubic good. Positive framing is the standard VCM, whereas subjects withdraw contributions from a common pool in the negative frame treatment.
Variables for this data set include the treatment variable Positive Frame, as well as the variables defined above. The frame is varied across sessions, which last for ten periods. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics on these variables for both data sets. Considering how different these two experiments are, the descriptive statistics are remarkably similar.
Average contributions are 36.0 percent of the endowment in the IW data, and 24.9 percent in the Andreoni data. The lower average contributions in the Andreoni data are probably are due to the negative frame treatment, which reduces overall contributions. Some of the difference may also be due to MCPR, which IW show affects contribution levels: IW use an MCPR of .3 and .75 while Andreoni uses a value of .5 for the MCPR. If we look at the average value the change in contributions in each period, c i,t , we observe that it is identical in both data sets at -0.03, indicating that contributions typically fall by three percentage points per round. The deviations from group variables also are very similar in the two data sets -0.145 compared with 0.124 -indicating a similar range of contributions for both studies. Finally, the initial contribution levels, C i,1 , are higher, overall, for the IW data, again probably due to the lower contributions in Andreoni's negative frame treatment. Model 2a is estimated using OLS and adjusts neither for two-sided censoring (at 0 or 100 percent donations) nor for the panel nature of the data. According to these estimates, in both data sets contributions decrease over time, falling about 2.7 -2.8 percentage points per round.
Estimation Results: Introducing Censoring and Panel Structure to the Basic Model
Both studies show statistically significant main treatment effects. In IW, a higher MPCR is estimated to increase contributions by 51 percentage points. Larger group size has a positive effect when MPCR is low -moving from a group size of 4 to a group size of 10 increases contributions by about 29 percentage points -but this effect is offset by the negative coefficient on the interaction term for the high MPCR case. This result explains why IW can only conclude "there appears to be no support for a pure numbers argument relating increases in group size to increases in free riding behavior… " (p. 196) . In Andreoni, the positive frame variable carries a positive, significant coefficient: the positive frame increases contributions by 17.4 percentage points.
Model 2b for both data sets uses Tobit estimation to account for the two-sided censoring in the data, and allows for the panel structure of the data sets by explicitly estimating individualspecific fixed effects. 4 A comparison of 2a and 2b allows us to examine the impact on the estimates of these two modeling changes. First, note that censoring and fixed effects are clearly present in both of these data sets: 49 percent of the IW observations are censored, as are 56 percent of the Andreoni observations. In addition, 52 and 67 percent of the fixed-effect dummy variable coefficients in each of these data sets are significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, and the joint null hypothesis that all of the fixed effects coefficients are zero is rejected for each data set with p-value less than .001. Individual-specific effects and censoring are clearly present in both data sets. But is failure to account for these features of the data consequential? We note that the estimates of the coefficient on the round number variable are nearly twice as large (5-6 percentage points per round versus 3 percentage points per round in the OLS estimates) once the fixed effects and censoring are treated appropriately -this is a difference of about 4 to 6 estimated standard errors in each case. In the IW data the coefficient on the MPCR variable is nearly twice as large as in the OLS estimates; again this is a difference of about 5 estimated standard errors. Furthermore, the coefficient estimate on the group size variable is no longer significant. Turning to the Andreoni data, the direction and significance of the treatment effect are unchanged, but as in the 4 It should also be noted that fixed effect dummy variable coefficients are not identified for subjects whose contribution is censored in every round, and are not, in practice, estimable for subjects whose contribution is censored in every round but one. This was the case for a notable fraction of the subjects in the Andreoni study (28/80) but only 2/84 for the IW study. 5 The individual fixed effect coefficient estimates are suppressed in the table for brevity. The fixed effect dummy for the last individual in each sample is omitted so that these estimates can be interpreted as the difference in the intercept relative to this individual. 
Estimation Results: Introducing Lags and Group Feedback
Adjusting for panel structure and censoring is clearly appropriate for these data sets, but the estimated models in Table 2 fail to allow for the possibility of correlation in a subject's decisions over time. In theory the random rematching of the subjects should render the outcomes independent in each round, since subjects should ignore information about one group in making a decision with another. A cursory examination of the sample data indicates otherwise. To allow for these serial correlations, we model the dynamics by including lagged values of the observed contribution. Results incorporating these dynamics are reported in Tables 3 and 4 .
Note that the number of observations is decreased to account for the calculation of the lagged values. In both tables, results are again reported for both OLS and censored panel regressions.
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In the OLS models, the coefficients on the lagged values are positive and significant, though their sum is less than one. (If the values sum to one, the model has a unit root.) Clearly there is substantial correlation in contributions from one round to the next. By comparison with Model 2a for both data sets in Table 2 , we see that adjusting for autocorrelation improves the fit of the model; the treatment effects now appear smaller in magnitude, however. Turning to the censored panel estimation results, the biases in the estimates of the treatment effects from neglecting the censoring and panel effects is evident: the coefficients on all treatment variables are larger in the censored panel models. The fixed effects are jointly significant in both data sets as well.
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Recall that the IW subjects are in stable groups, while the Andreoni subjects are randomly rematched. The dependence between rounds should be lower in the rematched data ( Tables 5 and 6 report models that examine the dynamics in more detail. An additional factor that is ignored by the basic model is the effect of recent history on subjects' decisions.
Each subject experiences a different history, since the identities of the subjects constituting the remainder of his group in the previous round are unique to him. We test the effect of this intragroup interaction by incorporating the two additional variables, Deviation from Group (+) and
Deviation from Group (-) defined in Section 4. These estimates are reported for the censored panel regression model in Tables 5 and 6 . (OLS estimates are not reported; the biases are similar to those reported above.) Models 5a and 6a allow the subject's response to differ, depending whether his or her contribution in the previous round was above or below the group average. A positive coefficient on these variables indicates adjustment away from the group average, while a negative coefficient means that the subject is adjusting his contribution toward the group average. In both data sets, if a subject's contribution is above the group average, the estimated coefficients 6 Note that the variable Round Number is not included in the reported estimates. While retaining the Round Number variable in the models improves the fit slightly, it leaves the coefficients unchanged in magnitude and significance, except for the "first" variable in the IW data, which changes sign. 7 Adjusting for fixed effects alone increases the treatment effect slightly (to .078). Adding censoring alone raises the coefficient to .170. These alternative specifications are available on request from the authors.
indicate that he will reduce his contribution significantly, by about 60 percent of the excess.
However, if his contribution is below the group average, there is no corresponding increase; the insignificance of this coefficient for both studies indicates no response. The null hypothesis that these two coefficients are equal is easily rejected: for the IW data, χ 2 (1) = 17.0, p < .001; and for the Andreoni data, χ
2
(1) = 6.8, p = .009. 8 As in the previous models, we again observe positive and significant coefficients on the lagged values, and significant treatment effects.
Models 5b and 6b extend the analysis by allowing the response to group feedback to vary by treatment. Here we interact the Deviation from Group variables with the treatment variables.
In the IW data, the estimated treatment effects appear relatively stable across the two specifications. None of the interaction effects is significant on its own, but a LR test rejects the null hypothesis that the effect of the interactions is zero (χ 2 (4) = 11.2, p = .024).
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In the Andreoni data, for both frames the coefficient on Deviation from Group (+) is negative, though the magnitude of the response is substantially greater in the negative frame.
Thus subjects in the negative frame are quicker to adjust their contributions downward, toward the group average. If the subject's contribution last period was below average, the negative coefficient on Negative Frame X Deviation from Group(-) indicates that the negative frame subjects are still more responsive. They adjust their contributions toward the group average more than the positive frame subjects, who do not respond significantly at all in this case. A likelihood ratio test for the null hypotheses that coefficients are equal across treatments can be rejected (χ 2 (2) = 12.0, p = .002). Thus we can conclude that the response to feedback differs by treatment; Andreoni's framing treatments affect contributions in part by affecting the subjects'
8 In both cases the restricted model (not shown) yields a negative coefficient estimate that is smaller in magnitude but still significantly different from zero at p<.001 (IW) and p<.05 (Andreoni) . 9 We also estimated a model dropping the interactions between MPCR and the Deviation from Group variables. Comparing this new model to Model 4 in Table 5 , we can reject the hypothesis of no interaction effects (χ response to what others are doing.
Does the initial contribution level signal "type"?
Each of the fixed effect models above shows that there is heterogeneity among subjects.
The evidence adduced above that subjects react to feedback about their group's contribution level suggests that a stable group consisting of relatively high initial contributors might lead to sustainable high contribution levels. GHMA test this hypothesis by "sorting" subjects into groups of others with similar contribution levels based on their initial first-period contributions.
The validity of this procedure depends on whether a subject's initial contribution level contains a unique signal of their "type" -that is, their propensity to contribute in subsequent periodswhich is distinct from the effects of the various treatments, such as MPCR, group size, or positive/negative framing. Tables 7 and 8 contain estimates for models that include C i,1 , the first period contribution level, as an explanatory variable. Note that the coefficient on C i,1 is positive and significant for both the IW and the Andreoni data.
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Using C i,1 as an indicator of type is problematic, however, since the level of initial contributions is no doubt affected by the treatments. If so, then C i,1 and C i,t for t>1 are jointly determined by the treatment effects, in which case the coefficient estimates on C i,1 become difficult to interpret as quantifying the effect of subject type on contributions.
Ideally, one would like to have a measure of type that is independent of treatment, as in Park (2000) . Failing that, however, the hypothesis that C i,1 reflects type (and that type matters)
can be tested by interacting C i,1 with the treatments and observing whether or not the impact of C i,1 on contributions is significant (and in the same direction) regardless of the treatment. GroupSize is not significantly different from zero, the coefficient on C i,1 is not significantly different for the subjects in groups of size 4 than for subjects in groups of size 10.
Turning to the results on the Andreoni data in Table 8 , the estimated coefficient on C i,1 is clearly positive and significant in Model 8a, but when the coefficient is separately estimated over the data for the positive and negative framing treatments using C i,1 X Positive Frame and C i,1 X Negative Frame, both coefficients become individually insignificant. They are also not significantly different from each other using a likelihood ratio test.
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Thus, it appears that the estimated coefficient on C i,1 is not significantly sensitive to the treatment for either of these two data sets. Consequently, it seems reasonable to interpret the positive estimated coefficient on C i,1 in Model 5 as quantifying the effect of subject type on contributions.
Conclusions
For the most part, our analysis confirms the direction of the treatment effects found by the original investigators in both data sets. We find (as did IW) that the MPCR is an important determinant of behavior in the VCM. Group size is a significant determinant of the allocation level when MPCR is low, but not when it is high. IW could only conclude that the effect is "weak and ambiguous." We also are able to determine that the impact of MPCR on allocations depends inversely on group size. Similarly, our results support Andreoni's conclusion that subjects contribute more when the public good is positively framed, but we also are able to show that the frame affects the speed with which subjects adjust their contributions to match those of the group.
Treating the data as a fixed-effects panel had limited effect on the qualitative results.
Although the fixed-effect dummy variables in the allocation regression are highly significant as a group, the key economic results are not sensitive to them. Indeed, even omitting these variables altogether does not substantially alter the conclusions, at least in these two data sets. Of course, one cannot know that is the case without (appropriately) including them. However, this robustness result reduces our concern that, because their number increases as one expand the number of subjects, such coefficients cannot be consistently estimated.
In contrast, we find that failure to appropriately deal with the censored nature of VCM data is quite consequential. While the direction of the treatment effect is rarely affected, its magnitude is sometimes substantially different when censoring is properly specified. It seems clear from our results that censoring is not an aspect of the data that can be safely ignored.
More importantly, we find economically and statistically significant, asymmetric crosssubject dynamics in the data. When a subject's allocation is above the average of the other members of the group, he reduces his contribution toward the group average; when he discovers his contribution is below average, he does not adjust toward the others. In other words, when a subject finds that he/she has contributed more than the rest of the group, that subject responds! This pattern of behavior is consistent with recent work on inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) , which asserts that people care about inequality, but that they care more when their income is below than when it is above others' income. Statistically, is not appropriate to adopt the past practice of analyzing data using methods that assume that the allocations are independently distributed across subjects. Allocations are correlated over time for a given individual, and across individuals.
Comparing the two data sets, we also conclude that random rematching has virtually no effect on the extent to which subjects respond to information about others' contributions.
Random rematching is commonly used in economics experiments, and the practice is used to justify the assumption of independence of decisions over time. Our results show that this is clearly not the case. In our data, random rematching does nothing to alter the dependence of decisions in a given period on feedback from the decisions in previous rounds. We also find that random rematching fails to eliminate serial correlation in individual contribution decisions. Thus dynamic regression analysis is imperative for valid statistical analysis of data generated by VCM experiments.
Finally, we examine the validity of using initial contributions as an indicator of subject type. We find that initial contributions do enter our models with a significant positive coefficient, which does not seem to be sensitive to the treatment regime. We conclude that, for these data sets at least, initial contribution may be a useful measure of subject type.
Our results suggest that the institutional design for the private provision of public goods could be improved by careful attention to the types of the participants, and the information that they receive. Selection of types into groups may result in at least some groups that attain Pareto efficient outcomes. In addition, information feedback that reassures contributors can keep contributions high.
This work builds on the points made by Roth (2002) regarding the use of experimental data in engineering market and nonmarket institutions. Game theory is extremely helpful in understanding the incentives and examining the equilibria inherent in any given situation.
However, experiments play a unique role in understanding how an individual's preferences and attitudes interact with the incentives in a game to produce actual behavior. Our results show that much more is going on in these games than attention limited soley to the incentive structure of the monetary payoffs would indicate. Subjects care about their own payoffs, but not so much that they will allow free riding to keep them from exploiting the gains to cooperation. When such gains are possible, subjects are willing to cooperate, but only if they observe others cooperating at least as much as they do. Institutional design that takes these preferences into consideration are likely to be much more effective at attaining appropriate levels of public goods production. a Note that the censored panel regression failed to converge when C 1 was included. a Note that the censored panel regression failed to converge when C i,1 was replace by C i,1 X Positive Frame and C i,1 X Negative Frame.
